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Abstract 
Company operations are characterized by information asymmetry between the agent (management and the board 
of directors) and the principal (shareholders).  The purpose of this study is to empirically examine the extent of 
monitoring mechanisms in Nigerian non-financial listed companies and the impact of managerial ownership and 
horizontal-agency-costs on the mechanisms.  The study adopted a quantitative approach and distributed 332 
questionnaires to 166 non-financial listed companies to obtain a cross-sectional data for the internal auditing.  The 
findings give credible evidence that the horizontal-agency-cost is positively significant while managerial 
ownership is negatively significant.  The findings of this study suggest policy implications for the monitoring roles 
of the board of directors as well as the internal and external auditors.  Likewise, the findings are useful to the 
regulatory agencies and government for a further review of corporate governance guidelines.  This paper 
contributes to knowledge by combining the three dimensions of monitoring mechanisms (directorship, internal and 
external auditing) in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
© 2016 Published by Future Academy www.FutureAcademy.org.uk 
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1. Introduction
Monitoring mechanisms as contained in each country’s code of corporate governance are designed 
to resolve agency problems.  Monitoring mechanisms can be internal or external (Huson, Parrino, & 
Starks, 2001).  Monitoring mechanisms are applied to align the activities of the management and 
controlling shareholders with the interests of other shareholders (Kao, Chiou, & Chen, 2004).  The 
relationship between the management and shareholders is characterized by information asymmetry, 
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moral hazard and goal conflicts (Slyke, 2006).  Failure to align the interests of the management, 
controlling shareholders, a board of directors and other investors results in high agency costs.  Such 
failures account for the incidence of the financial crisis and frequent business failure, which suggest the 
need for investors’ protection (Mustapha & Che-Ahmad, 2011).  Therefore, monitoring mechanisms 
are meant to constrain ineffectiveness that can result from the agency problems (He & Ho, 2010).  
Therefore, monitoring mechanisms are required to mitigate the agency costs. 
There are speculations in the extant literature that good corporate governance enhances internal and 
external monitoring mechanisms (Huson et al., 2001).  Hence, the continuance of reviews of codes of 
corporate governance to ensure adequacy of monitoring mechanisms (Huson et al., 2001).  
Despite the increasing importance of monitoring mechanisms and continuance review of codes of 
corporate governance, the incidence of business failures and poor economy persist especially in the 
Sub-Saharan Africa.  There are many studies on monitoring mechanisms (Kao et al., 2004; Slyke, 
2006; Azim, 2012; Anderson, Francis, & Stokes, 1993).  However, most of this studies are from 
developed and transiting countries like U.S, U.K, and Malaysia, leaving the developing countries like 
Nigeria far behind.  Many of these studies address only one or two of the three dimensions of the 
monitoring mechanisms (directorship, internal auditing, and external auditing).  Many that studied 
directorship did it in part.  Examples are studies of audit committee only, independent directors alone, a 
part of board composition and one or two parts of board activities. 
There is a dearth of research on monitoring mechanisms in Nigeria.  There are few studies on 
ownership (Ehikioya, 2009; Uadiale, 2010) in Nigeria.  However, to the best of the knowledge of the 
researchers, none of the studies is on horizontal-agency-costs.  Neither is there any of the studies that 
tested monitoring mechanisms as a combination of directorship, internal auditing and external auditing 
in Nigeria. 
2011 SEC code of corporate governance supports the need for the three dimensions of monitoring 
mechanisms (directorship, internal auditing, and external auditing).  Nigerian Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) maintains that weak corporate governance is responsible for some corporate 
failures in Nigeria.  It, therefore, plan to fully enforce the new code as the new code makes provision 
for accountability, transparency and good corporate governance in Nigerian companies. 
Reports of business failures, mergers, and bankruptcy within the last decade have been very 
disturbing.  Reasons for these miseries are inadequate monitoring and enforcement of the code of 
corporate governance (Nworji, Adebayo, & Adeyanju, 2011).  Therefore, this paper aims to empirically 
test the relationship between organizational attributes (in the context of managerial ownership and type 
II agency problem) and monitoring mechanisms (directorship, internal auditing, and external auditing).  
However, this is the first published study, to the best of the knowledge of the researchers that has 
studied monitoring mechanisms from this perspective in Nigeria.  Likewise, this will be the first to test 
type II agency problem in Nigeria. 
The section following this part of the paper reviews the literature and develop hypotheses.  Next to 
this is the section that discusses methodology, followed by result and discussion section, and then, the 
conclusion section. 
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2. Literature Review 
The Nigerian Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), conducts oversight functions over all 
listed companies in Nigeria.  The companies are incorporated under the Companies and Allied Matters 
Act (1990 and as amended in 2004).  However, SEC is the regulatory authority responsible for 
regulating the activities of the companies (financial and non-financial) especially as it relates to the 
capital market.  The main objective of SEC is to ensure that investors are protected.  SEC revised 2003 
code of corporate governance to inject fairness, efficiency and transparency into the capital market and 
reduce the systematic risks of the market.  The government approved the new code of corporate 
governance, 2011 SEC Code for this purpose (SEC, 2011).  The commission encouraged both the 
public and private companies to apply the principles in the code of corporate governance as appropriate 
in the conduct of the affairs of each company.  SEC in line with agency theory seeks to find solutions 
to information asymmetry, underlined by corruption through expropriation of assets by one party at the 
detriment of the other.  It also seeks in line with stakeholders theory to ensure adequate provisions for 
the interests of all parties to the contracts of a company. 
There are many definitions for monitoring mechanisms in the existing literature (Huson et al., 2001; 
Kao et al., 2004; Slyke, 2006; Mustapha & Che-Ahmad, 2011).  However, it is clear from all the 
definitions that shareholders rely on the monitoring mechanisms to resolve agency problems in 
companies with their investments.  A study by Azim (2012) on the impact of corporate governance 
mechanisms on company performance claims that monitoring mechanisms can effectively reduce 
agency problem.  The study of Choi, Lee, and Sonu (2013), examines factors that determine human 
resource investment in internal controls.  The study finds that good monitoring mechanisms reduce the 
need for a company to invest much on intellectual capital to have an effective internal control.  The 
study of Anderson et al. (1993), investigates how auditing and directorships relate to the demand for 
monitoring.  The study claims that directorship, internal and external monitoring are part of monitoring 
mechanisms companies use to ensure good corporate governance.  Generally, monitoring mechanisms 
helps to ensure good corporate governance by reducing agency costs through alignment of the interests 
of management and shareholders (Huson et al., 2001; Slyke, 2006; Choi et al., 2013; SEC, 2011). 
This paper, therefore, examines how monitoring mechanisms (directorship, internal and external 
auditing) resolve agency problems in the non-financial sector of Nigeria concerning managerial 
ownership and horizontal-agency-costs. 
3. Hypotheses Development 
3.1. Managerial Ownership (MO) 
Agency theory suggests that management is characterized by callous attitudes resulting in the 
expropriation of company assets and information asymmetry.  Extant literature has shown that attitudes 
of a staff-manager differ from his attitudes as an owner-manager (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Jusoh & 
Che-Ahmad, 2014).  These studies suggest that managerial ownership is an incentive for management 
to align its interests with the shareholders’ interests.  By so doing, there may be less demand for 
monitoring because there is no separation between ownership and control.  However, the extent of the 
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alignment is determined by the degree of the ownership (Jusoh & Che-Ahmad, 2014).  The greater the 
MO, the less severe the agency problem (Amran & Che-Ahmad, 2013).  However, this could be to the 
detriment of the minority shareholders. 
The study of Mustapha and Che-Ahmad (2011) investigates agency theory and managerial 
ownership (MO) using data from 235 Malaysian listed companies.  The study finds that MO inversely 
relates to total monitoring costs.  Thus, the study suggests that there may be less demand for 
monitoring in a company with owner-manager.  However, the study of Jusoh and Che-Ahmad (2014) 
finds that MO negatively and significantly relates to company performance. 
The expectation, therefore, is that managerial ownership (MO) is likely to align the shareholders and 
agents’ interests, thereby reducing the cost of monitoring.  This study, therefore, considers related 
hypotheses as shown below: 
 
H1a Managerial ownership negatively influences the demand for monitoring mechanisms 
(directorship, internal and external auditing). 
H1ai  Managerial ownership negatively influences the demand for directorship as a 
monitoring mechanism 
H1aii  Managerial ownership negatively influences the demand for internal auditing as a 
monitoring mechanism. 
H1aiii Managerial ownership negatively influences the demand for external auditing 
monitoring mechanism. 
 
3.2. Block-holding (Horizontal-agency-costs) 
Stakeholders’ theory suggests that no stakeholder should be rendered a means to an end because; all 
stakeholders have claims on the company.  Existing literature reveal that block-holding is an important 
organizational attribute for effective monitoring of management activities (Mustapha & Che-Ahmad, 
2013; Reuer, Tong, & Wu, 2012)  These literature suggest different types of block-holders, such as 
institutional (Mustapha & Che-Ahmad, 2013); individual (Eng & Mak, 2003); inside/outside (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976); independent/executive (R. C. Anderson, Mansi, & Reeb, 2003); multiple (Connelly, 
Hoskisson, Tihanyi, & Certo, 2010); second-largest (Chen, Firth, Gao, & Rui, 2006).  Each of these 
types of block-holding has a distinct role to play in good corporate governance (Hope, 2013). 
The study of Jensen and Meckling, 1976), examines the theory of the firm.  The study claims that 
the extent of monitoring by shareholders is a function of the amount of shares held or the spread of the 
shares among the shareholders.  Hope (2013), investigates large shareholders.  The study claims that an 
increase in the shareholding of the second-largest shareholder empowers the shareholder to effectively 
prevent the largest shareholder from exploiting minority shareholders.  It also claims that it is 
concerned with the majority shareholders’ conflicts with the minority shareholders.  Such conflict is 
otherwise known as Type II agency conflicts or horizontal-agency-cost (Lei, Lin, & Wei, 2013).  It is a 
situation, whereby, large shareholders monitor one another and as a result, improve the performance of 
the company by reducing expropriation of company’s assets (Pagano & Roell, 1998).  The expectation 
following discussion is that increase in the stake of a second-largest shareholder is likely to protect the 
interest of the minority shareholders.  Thereby, there will be more demand for monitoring.  The study, 
therefore, considers related hypotheses as follows: 
H2a Horizontal-agency-costs positively influences the demand for monitoring mechanisms 
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(directorship, internal and external auditing). 
H2ai  Horizontal-agency-costs positively influences the demand for directorship as a 
monitoring mechanism 
H2aii  Horizontal-agency-costs positively influence the demand for internal auditing as a 
monitoring mechanism. 
H2aiii 
 
Horizontal-agency-costs positively influence the demand for external auditing 
monitoring mechanism. 
4. Methodology 
4.1. Sample 
This study used the quantitative method to analyse data extracted from the annual reports of 111 
Nigerian non-financial listed companies. The annual reports were collected from the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange.  The researchers also used questionnaires to obtain data on internal auditing as the 
information is not available on annual reports.  Both the managerial ownership (MO) and horizontal-
agency-costs (BOC) are obtainable from the annual reports and are continuous data.  The dimensions 
of the dependent variable, monitoring mechanisms (MC), except for the internal auditing are available 
from annual reports and are continuous data. 
4.2. Measurement 
The dependent variable, monitoring mechanisms (MC) is measured by summing up the costs of 
non-executive directors’ remunerations (NEDIR), the costs of internal auditing (IAC) and external 
audit fees (EAC) all in Nigerian currency, naira (N). 
The measurement for the managerial ownership (MO) is the proportion of the shares held by 
management to company’s total share.  The horizontal-agency-costs (BOC) measurement is the change 
in the shareholding of BOC, current year compared to the immediately preceding year. 
The control variables company performance is the proportion of the interest before tax and interest 
to total assets.  The company complexity (CY) is the number of subsidiaries held by the company. The 
panel data model for the study is as shown below: 
 
MCit = αit + β1MOit  + β2BOCit + β3FPit + β4CYit + µit + εit 
Where: 
MC 
MO 
BOC 
FP 
CY 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
Monitoring Cost 
Managerial Ownership 
Horizontal-agency-costs 
Company Performance 
Company’s Complexity 
5. Results and Discussion 
The researchers administered 332 questionnaires in 166 Nigerian non-financial listed companies.  
The researchers gave one questionnaire to the internal auditor and another one to either the head of 
accounts or the company secretary.  The expectation was to receive at least one back from each 
company.  Nigerian Stock Exchange released the annual reports for periods 2010 to 2012 on demand. 
Out of 117 questionnaires received only 111 for which there were corresponding annual reports 
were analysed.  The researchers used SPSS 22 to run descriptive analysis and Stata to test the 
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hypotheses using panel data regression technique.  The male respondents are 80.2%, and females are 
19.8%.  Of these respondents, 48.6% are Internal Auditors, 38.7% Accountants and 12.6% Company 
Secretaries.  46.8% of them have been with their companies for less than 5 years, 36% for 6 to 10 
years. 
The F-test for the model suggests statistical significance.  The mean value of the independent 
variables, managerial ownership, and horizontal-agency-costs are respectively 0.109 and 3.769.  The 
minimum scores for the two variables are 0 and -9.26 respectively and maximum scores of 59.17 and 
13.09.  Thus, the model meets the minimum requirement for multivariate analysis.  66.4% of the 
companies are with managerial ownership.  4.5% changes in the stake of horizontal-agency-costs were 
negative; 85.6% were with no change possibly due to the persisting financial crisis and 9.9% were with 
positive changes. 
Tables 1 and 2 show the results of the regression model ran using Stata.  The results present 
collinearity, multicollinearity, variance inflation factors (VIF) and tolerance of the study.  The VIF is 
below 5 and tolerance is above 0.2.  Table 2 reveals that the variables are not highly correlated with 
one another.  All the correlations values are well below 0.9. Hence, this study can, therefore, conclude 
that there is no multicollinearity problem for variables that this paper examines. 
 
Table 1.Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) 
 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Managerial Ownership 1.01 0.985 
Horizontal-agency-costs 1.00 0.998 
Company Performance 1.02 0.979 
Company’s Complexity 1.01 0.992 
Mean VIF 1.01   
 
Table 2. Pearson Correlation 
 
 
Monitoring 
Mechanisms 
Managerial 
Ownership 
Second- 
largest 
Shareholders 
Company 
Performance  Company’s Complexity 
Monitoring Mechanisms 1.000      
Managerial Ownership -0.209 1.000     
Horizontal-agency-costs 0.123 0.009 1.000    
Company Performance 0.208 -0.116 0.029 1.000   
Company’s Complexity 0.434 -0.022 0.027 -0.079 1.000 
 
The study ran the data for regression analysis using the pool, fixed effect, random effect and panel-
corrected standard errors (PSCEs).  The researchers choose to use the results from PSCEs because of 
its robustness nature (Beck & Katz, 1995).  Also, the model could correct for heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation [29].  The result is as shown in Table 3.  The results suggest that the managerial 
ownership (MO), horizontal-agency-costs (BOC) and the two control variables (company performance 
and complexity) are significant predictor variables for monitoring mechanisms (MC).  The results show 
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that MO (b=-0.046, z=-12.27) significantly affects the MC at 1%.  It indicates that a unit increase in 
MO results in a decrease of 0.046 in MC.  Type II agency problem, horizontal-agency-costs (b=0.0225, 
z=1.8) significantly affects MC at 10%.  It indicates that a unit increase in the stake of the horizontal-
agency-costs will yield an increase of 0.0225 in MC.  The two control variables, company performance 
(FP – b=2.649, z=2.63) and company complexity (CY – b=0.263, z=15.4) also affects MC significantly 
at 1%.  A unit increase in FP will result in 2.649 increase in MC while a unit increase in CY yields an 
increase of 0.263 in MC.  The z-tests as already indicated above and in the table confirm further the 
significance of the relationship between the variables as all are above the threshold of 1.65.  The p-
values are also all below 5% for MO, BOC, FP and CY. 
 
Table 3. Panel Data Regression Results 
 
MC Coef. Std. Err. z P>z 
Managerial Ownership -0.046 0.004 -12.27 0.000 
Horizontal-agency-costs 0.225 0.125 1.8 0.072 
Company Performance 2.649 1.007 2.63 0.009 
Company’s Complexity 0.263 0.017 15.4 0.000 
_cons 2.760 0.216 12.78 0.000 
 
The result supports hypothesis 1 that managerial ownership (MO) negatively influences the demand 
for monitoring mechanisms, directorship, internal and external auditing.  This conforms to the earlier 
studies in the developed and transiting countries (Mustapha & Che-Ahmad, 2011; Eng & Mak, 2003).  
Both ownership and control are entrenched in the same person(s).  Hence, there is no need for 
monitoring by another party.  89.5% MO in the study is below 5%.  Hence, there may be no urge to 
demand monitoring as the owner-manager becomes more efficient controlling the company assets and 
is with less information asymmetry. 
The result also supports hypothesis 2 that Horizontal-agency-costs positively influences the demand 
for monitoring mechanisms, directorship, internal and external auditing.  The result conforms to the 
findings of Hope, Langli, and Thomas (2012).  The increase in the shareholding results in an increase 
in the ability and willingness of the second-largest holder to monitor the largest shareholder (owner-
manager).  Thereby, monitoring costs increase with the increase in the demand for monitoring by the 
horizontal-agency-costs.  Protection of minority shareholders is emphasized by Nigerian SEC 2011, 
and monitoring by the second-largest shareholders is a good tool to achieve this. 
There are extant literature on monitoring mechanisms (Hope, 2013; Ali & Lesage, 2013; Anderson 
et al., 1993).  However, none except Mustapha and Che-Ahmad (2011) tests the impact of managerial 
ownership on monitoring mechanisms (MC) as a combination of directorship, internal and external 
auditing.  None, to the best of the knowledge of the researchers, has tested the impact of the second 
largest shareholders on monitoring mechanisms (MC) as a combination of directorship, internal and 
external auditing.  The academic community is positioned to investigate more into this as it affects 
Sub-Saharan African considering the difference in their culture, politics, economy and other possible 
endogeneity factors that might affect this result. 
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To check for robustness of the model, the researchers subjected the data to further test using the 
structural equation model.  The result confirms further the significance of the variables, managerial 
ownership (MO), horizontal-agency-costs (BOC), company performance (FP) and company 
complexity (CY) to the monitoring mechanisms (MC).  All the z values are above 1.65 and p-values 
significant at 1% except BOC, which is significant at 10%. 
6. Conclusion 
This study adds to the literature on managerial ownership and agency conflicts among shareholders 
due to the likelihood that it may be the first paper that combines the three dimensions of monitoring 
mechanisms (directorship, internal and external auditing) in Sub-Saharan Africa, Nigeria in particular.  
The study finds that managerial ownership is negatively significant while horizontal-agency-cost is 
positively significant in the relationship with monitoring mechanisms (directorship, internal and 
external auditing).  The primary contribution of the study is that managerial ownership and horizontal-
agency-costs significantly impact monitoring mechanisms and also complement the monitoring 
mechanisms.  These findings are useful for the investors, board of directors, regulatory bodies and 
government to ensure the protection of minority shareholders.  The data used for this study is limited to 
non-financial listed companies.  Future studies may, therefore, consider financial listed companies. 
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